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NOTES
PREVENTING THE USE OF UNENFORCEABLE
PROVISIONS IN RESIDENTIAL LEASES
In recent years, many jurisdictions have declared certain res-
idential lease provisions void as against public policy. Even though
these clauses have no legal effect, landlords continue to include
them in their leases. The reason is simple-a clause with no legal
effect can still have tremendous practical effect if the tenant be-
lieves that it is binding. The tenant who looks to his lease to ascer-
tain his rights could be deceived into foregoing valid claims or
defenses against his landlord. This Note proposes legislation en-
suring disclosure, on the face of residential leases, of tenants' legal
rights. Tenant awareness can stem the abuses that result from the
continued use of unenforceable lease provisions.
I
THE CONTINUED USE OF INVALID LEASE PROVISIONS
Tenants deserve protection from grossly unfair and one-sided
lease provisions. Some commentators have recommended that
courts apply the doctrine of unconscionability to such clauses in
residential leases.' Indeed, several courts have done so. 2  The
problem, however, transcends the case-by-case approach of
unconscionability -even if the court strikes a provision from one
lease, similar provisions in other leases remain untouched.3
1 See Note, Exculpatory Clauses in Standard Form Leases: A Need for Direct Judicial Action,
28 U. Prrr. L. REv. 85, 95-97 (1966); 6 IND. L. REv. 108, 117 (1972); 47 WASH. L. REv.
750, 755 (1972).
2 See Harwood v. Lincoln Square Apts. Section 5, Inc., 78 Misc. 2d 1097, 359 N.Y.S.2d
387 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1974); Seabrook v. Commuter Hous. Co., 72 Misc. 2d 6, 338 N.Y.S.2d
67 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 79 Misc. 2d 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d 566 (Sup. Ct.
1973); cf. Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971) (commercial
lease).
3 See Berger, Hard Leases Make Bad Law, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 791, 816-17 (1974); Gar-
rity, Redesigning Landlord-Tenant Concepts for an Urban Society, 46 J. URB. L. 695, 708 (1968);
Kirby, Contract Law and the Form Lease: Can Contract Law Provide the Answer?, 71 Nw. U. L. REv.
204, 224, 226 (1976). Kirby emphasizes that the doctrine of unconscionability is "merely a
stop-gap measure designed to remedy the most pressing abuses" and not a comprehensive
answer to the problems of the form lease. Id. at 224. In addition, the application of the
unconscionability provision of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C. § 2-302) to residen-
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Legislatures and courts in many jurisdictions have responded by
declaring certain residential lease provisions invalid per se. These
lawmakers and judges recognize that, although a residential lease
is an agreement between private parties, certain types of
clauses-among them exculpatory clauses, 4 waivers of statutory
rights, 5 confession of judgment clauses, 6 provisions requiring a
tial leases has been severely criticized as contrary to legislative intent. See Berger, supra,
at 811.
4 See Tenants Council v. DeFranceaux, 305 F. Supp. 560 (D.D.C. 1969); Feldman v.
Stein Bldg. & Lumber Co., 6 Mich. App. 180, 148 N.W.2d 544, appeal denied, 379 Mich.
761 (1967); Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265, 18 A.2d 377 (1941); Kuzmiak v. Brookches-
ter, Inc., 33 N.J. Super. 575, 111 A.2d 425 (1955); ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.040(a)(3) (1975);
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1315(A)(3) (1974); CAL. CIv. CODE § 1668 (West 1973), con-
strued in Hanna v. Lederman, 223 Cal. App. 2d 786, 36 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1963); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 47a-4(a)(3) (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5515 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
83.47(1)(b) (West Supp. 1978); HAW. REV. STAT. § 521-33 (1976); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80, §
91 (1975); 1978 Iowa Acts, ch. 1172, § II(1)(d); KAN. STAT. § 58-2547(a)(4) (1976) (com-
mon areas excepted); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.570(1)(d) (Baldwin Supp. 1978); MD.
REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-105 (1974) (limited to common areas); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
186, § 15 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1969) (limited to common areas); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-
24-202(3) (1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1415(1)(d) (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. §
118A.220(1)(d) (1977); N.Y. GEN. OBLG. LAW § 5-321 (McKinney 1978); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5321.13(D) (Page Supp. 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 113(A)(4) (West Supp.
1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 91.745(1)(c) (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-2813(a)(2) (1976); VA.
CODE § 55-248.9(a)(4 ) (Supp. 1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.230(2)(d) (Supp.
1977).
5 See Tenants Council v. DeFranceaux, 305 F. Supp. 560 (D.D.C. 1969); ALASKA STAT.
§ 34.03.040(a)(1) (1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1315(A)(1) (1974); CAL. CIV. CODE §§
1942.1, 1953 (West Supp. 1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-12-103(7) (1973); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 47a-4(a)(1) (1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.47(1)(a) (West Supp. 1978); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 521-31(a) (1976); 1978 Iowa Acts, ch. 1172, § 11(1)(a); KAN. STAT. § 58-2547(a)(1)
(1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.570(1)(a) (Baldwin Supp. 1978); MD. REAL PROP. CODE
ANN. § 8-208(a)(2) (Supp. 1978); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 186, §§ 14-21 (Michie/Law. Co-op
Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.32 (West Supp. 1978); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-
202(1) (1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1415(1)(a) (1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 118A.220(1)(a)
(1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-36 (West Supp. 1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-7-16 (Supp.
1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.13(A) (Page Supp. 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. fit. 41, §
113(A)(1) (West Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 91.745(1)(a) (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. §
64-2811(a) (1976); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5236e, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1978); VA.
CODE § 55-2 4 8.9(a)(1) (Supp. 1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.230(2)(b) (Supp.
1977).
6 ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.040(a)(2) (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-4(a)(2) (1979); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 6104 (1974); HAW. REV. STAT. § 521-34 (1976); 1978 Iowa Acts, ch.
1172, § 11(1)(b); KAN. STAT. § 58-2547(a)(2) (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.570(1)(b)
(Baldwin Supp. 1978); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-208(a)(1) (Supp. 1978); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 70-24-202(2) (1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1415(1)(b) (1976); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 118A.220(1)(b) (1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.13(B) (Page Supp. 1978); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 113(A)(2) (West Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 91.745(1)(b) (1977);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 64 -2813(a)(1) (1976); VA. CODE § 55-248.9(a)(2) (Supp. 1978); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.230(2)(b) (Supp. 1977).
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tenant to pay the landlord's attorney's fees in any judicial action
arising under the lease,7 and waivers of the right to a jury
trial 8-are so contrary to established public policy that they can-
not be upheld under any circumstances.
Notwithstanding the unenforceability of such clauses, landlords
continue to use form leases containing them. Studies have shown
that traditional form leases are "outdated and seldom revised" de-
spite the many recent developments in landlord-tenant law. 9
Form leases in New York, for instance, continue to include excul-
patory clauses and jury trial waivers even though state law pro-
vides that these types of provisions are unenforceable when used
in a rental agreement. 10 Similarly, six years after the Illinois
legislature invalidated exculpatory provisions in leases, the
Chicago Real Estate Board form lease still contained such a
clause." The Real Estate Board continued to use the form lease
despite many protests and its own admission of the clause's in-
validity.' 2  Indeed, a landlord in the business of renting residen-
tial dwelling units is likely to know of changes in landlord-tenant
law.' 3 Unfortunately, a tenant is not.
7 See ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.040(a)(4) (1975); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1315(A)(2)
(1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-4(a)( 7 ) (1978) (lease cannot bind tenant to pay landlord's
attorney's fees in excess of 15% of any judgment against tenant); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, §
6102 (1974); 1978 Iowa Acts, ch. 1172, § II(1)(c); KAN. STAT. § 58-2547(a)(3) (1976); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 383.570(I)(c) (Baldwin Supp. 1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 7 6-1415(1)(c)
(1976); NEV. REV. STAT. § 118A.220(I)(c) (1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.13(C) (Page
Supp. 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 113(A)(3) (West Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 55-
248.9(a)(3) (Supp. 1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.230(2)(c) (Supp. 1977).
8 MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-208(a)(4) (Supp. 1978); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 186, §
15F (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1978); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 259-c (McKinney 1968).
See Bentley, An Alternative Residential Lease, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 836, 837 (1974);
Berger, supra note 3, at .791.
10 Bentley, supra note 9, at 852. Although Bentley's study is nearly five years old, its
finding that leases in New York contain unenforceable provisions remains valid. For exam-
ple, an examination of the form lease used by one large apartment complex in Ithaca, New
York, reveals the presence of both an exculpatory clause and a jury trial waiver. (Copy of
lease on file at the Cornell Law Review).
11 See Hearings on Landlord-Tenant Law Before the Interim Comm. on Judiciary of the Cal.
Assembly 8-9 (Oct. 1972) (Statement of Julian Levi, Reporter/Draftsman, Uniform Residen-
tial Landlord and Tenant Act) [hereinafter cited as California Hearings]; P. MARTIN, THE
ILL-HOUSED, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TENANTS' RIGHTS IN PRIVATE AND PUBLIc HOUSING
1069 (1971); Groll, The Unform Lease: A Necessity for Effective Reform, 5 VAL. L. REV. 81, 89
(1970).
12 See California Hearings, supra note 11, at 9 (testimony of Julian Levi, Reporter/
Draftsman, Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act).
12 See Clocksin, Consumer Problems in the Landlord-Tenant Relationship, 9 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 572, 572 (1974). Landlords, of course, are not a homogeneous lot. Dugald
Gillies of the California Real Estate Association has testified:
524 [Vol. 64:522
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Tenants continue to sign such leases because they do not know
that certain provisions are unenforceable. Moreover, even those
tenants aware of the law often have no real choice.1 4  The dispar-
ity in bargaining power that almost always exists between the par-
ties to a residential lease is a "universally recognized problem." t5
Form leases are presented to tenants on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis."6 One study has shown that tenants are aware of their in-
ferior bargaining power and are consequently reluctant to even
ask for better lease terms.' 7  In addition, the tight housing mar-
ket in most areas limits the ability of tenants to shop around; 18
they will generally encounter virtually identical lease terms
elsewhere.' 9 These lease terms, of course, reflect the interests of
The best information we can get indicates about 50 percent of all the rental
housing in.this state is provided by what you have to call "mama and papa"
operations. These are a man and his wife, who own one or two of the units....
These people do not have the sophistication that one might expect of the big
landlord. The other 50 percent of the housing is provided in this state, either
by larger owners or by persons who place their property in the hands of pro-
fessional property management.
California Hearings, supra note 11, at 17. It is safe to assume that "big" landlords are aware
of changes in the law. One goal of any reform legislation should be to ensure that all
landlords are informed of recent changes in landlord-tenant law. As Bentley notes, tradi-
tional form leases misinform landlords as well as tenants. See Bentley, supra note 9, at 837.
14 As one court has said, it is not "a meaningful answer to say that tenants have the
right to negotiate for better terms in their leases. The blunt fact is that most people cannot
rent apartments in our urban society without signing form leases that are simply grotesque
in their one-sidedness." Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 73 Misc. 2d 996, 1000, 343
N.Y.S.2d 406, 411 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1973).
Is Mueller, Residential Tenants and Their Leases: An Empirical Study, 69 MIcH. L. REv.
247, 247 (1970). See Berger, supra note 3, at 791; Clocksin, supra note 13, at 572.
16 See Simmons v. Columbus Venetian Stevens Bldgs., Inc., 20 Ill. App. 2d 1, 31-33,
155 N.E.2d 372, 386-87 (1958); Clocksin, supra note 13, at 572.
1'7 See Mueller, supra note 15, at 264-70, 276-77. In his study of 100 tenants and their
leases in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Mueller found that 43 tenants believed they were in too
weak a bargaining position to obtain any concessions from the landlord, and 35 thought
any such request would be immediately denied. Id. at 268. Mueller noted that "bargaining
power is, in part, a function of the extent of one's knowledge of the particular subject
matter that is being negotiated." Id. at 269. He found that many tenants had little under-
standing of landlord-tenant law and the effect of even simple lease terms. See note 22 and
accompanying text infra. Mueller did discover that a small minority of his sample popula-
tion of tenants were relatively sophisticated bargainers. He suggests that "persons accus-
tomed to the process of negotiation as part of their occupational activities are inclined to
transfer these bargaining skills to their private affairs." Mueller, supra note 15, at 268.
Professionals and salesmen made up most of Mueller's small group of "bargainers." Id.
"s See Clocksin, supra note 13, at 572.
"9 See Note, Landlord-Tenant Reform: Arizona's Version of the Uniform Act, 16 ARIZ. L. REv.
79, 91 (1974).
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the party who proffers the form lease. After a survey of form
leases from sixteen cities around the United States, Professor Cur-
tis Berger concluded:
Only two leases ... fairly presented any of the lease ele-
ments, and even these leases had somewhat or strongly pro-
landlord bias in other elements....
... The leases almost all treat the residential tenant as a
latter-day serf. One sees a near-pathological concern with ten-
ant duties and landlord remedies .... Much of the remaining
text seeks to immunize landlord against the claims of his ten-
ant.
2 0
Use of unenforceable lease provisions may deprive the tenant
of his rights. If a dispute arises with his landlord, the tenant will
likely examine his lease to determine his rights. 2 Many tenants
cannot comprehend even simple lease clauses.22 In addition, ten-
ants seldom have legal counsel 23 and receive little information
concerning recent changes in the law. 24  Consequently, many ten-
ants give credence to lease provisions even if they are unenforce-
able.23 Moreover, a landlord can use such a clause as a "lever to
extract performance from or prevent action by [a] tenant," 26 or
even to deter a tenant from seeking counsel.27 This in terrorem
20 Berger, supra note 3, at 835 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
21 See MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE 20 (Tent. Draft 1969) [hereinafter
cited as MODEL CODE].
22 In Mueller's survey of well-educated tenants, only 50% understood the meaning and
effect of simple lease terms. See Mueller, supra note 15, at 276. Only 33% of the tenants
correctly answered a question designed to test their comprehension of a sample clause
which combined "a tenant's repair obligation with a clause exculpating the landlord from
damages to the tenant's person or property." Id. at 261-62.
23 A study of cases filed and tried in the Landlord-Tenant Division of the Common
Pleas Court in Detroit found that only 7.3% of the tenants were represented by counsel.
See Mosier & Soble, Modern Legislation, Metropolitan Court, Miniscule Results: A Study of De-
roit's Landlord-Tenant Court, 7 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 8, 35 n.70 (1973). The study also found
that 49.2% of the landlords were represented by counsel. Id.
24 See Kirby, supra note 3, at 233.
25 See Moran, Proposed Statutory Alterations of the Landlord-Tenant Relationship for the State
of Illinois, 19 DEPAUL L. REv. 752, 768 (1970). See generally E. JARMEL, LEGAL REPRESENTA-
TION OF THE POOR 315 (1968); Groll, supra note 11, at 89; Kirby, supra note 3, at 233.
Bentley notes that a form lease that includes unenforceable lease provisions does not "in-
form the parties accurately of their rights and duties, [and it] discourages the majority of
tenants from pursuing rights otherwise granted them by law." Bentley, supra note 9, at 857.
See MODEL CODE, supra note 21, at 20.
20 Note, supra note 19, at 95-96.
21 See Moran, supra note 25, at 768.
[Vol. 64:522
1979] RESIDENTIAL LEASES
effect of invalid lease provisions has been recognized by au-
thorities in landlord-tenant law.2 8  In an empirical study of resi-
dential tenants and their leases in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Warren
Mueller noted that "the tenant, who may not be acquainted with
the practice of legal draftsmen or shrewd ... lessors of inserting
clauses in leases purely for their persuasive or in terrorem effect,
finds it difficult to see any logic in filling a lease form with legally
worthless verbiage." 29
II
RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEM
A. Application of State Consumer Protection Statutes to Residential
Leases
In Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc.,30 the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court held that the leasing of residential housing
is within the purview of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices
and Consumer Protection Law. 3 I The Commonwealth had
charged twenty-five landlords and four distributors of form leases
with violations of that law, alleging that the defendants' form
leases contained unfair and deceptive provisions and failed to in-
form tenants of their statutory rights. 32  Appealing from a dis-
28 See e.g., MODEL CODE, supra note 21, at 19; Moran, supra note 25, at 768; Mueller,
supra note 15, at 274. Professor Levi has testified:
Despite the protest of the Chicago Bar Association, for years the Chicago
Real Estate Board put [an unenforceable exculpatory] provision in their leases.
... [Their] argument was, "It isn't valid so what is the difference". Now that's
the kind of a convenient answer that we as practical people know doesn't mean
anything. What do you think happens when an injury occurs or damage occurs
and the insurance adjuster comes out and talks to the tenant? And I'm not
talking about the poor tenant at all. And he says to the tenant, "you waived
your rights;" and he shows him the lease. You think the average tenant in that
kind of a case has legal advice? Of course, he doesn't; and he is taken advan-
tage of.
California Hearings, supra note 11, at 8-9. Once a tenant receives legal advice, an unenforce-
able provision loses its in terrorem effect, but its inclusion in a duly executed lease undoubt-
edly deters tenants from even seeking counsel. See Moran, supra note 25, at 768.
29 Mueller, supra note 15, at 274 (emphasis in original). Mueller went on to note:
"Three tenants ... [of the many in the study who assumed that the fine-print terms were
enforceable] added comments to their answers expressing surprise that a provision could
be other than 'valid and enforceable' if it appeared in an executed lease." Id. at 277 n. 120.
30 459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 812 (1974).
31 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 201-1 to -9 (Purdon Supp. 1978).
32 These provisions included exculpatory clauses, waivers of statutory rights, and con-
fession of judgment provisions. 459 Pa. at 455, 329 A.2d at 814.
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missal of the complaint,33 the Commonwealth argued that the
leasing of residential housing is a sale or distribution of property
under the definition of trade or commerce set forth in the stat-
ute. 34  Broadly construing the words "sale [of] ... any prop-
erty," 3 the supreme court agreed:
Functionally viewed, the modern apartment dweller is a
consumer of housing services. The contemporary leasing of res-
idences envisions one person (landlord) exchanging for
periodic payments of money (rent) a bundle of goods and ser-
vices, rights and obligations....
The purchaser of this bundle (tenant) is as much a con-
sumer as is the purchaser of an automobile, household appli-
cance, or any other consumer good. 36
The application of state consumer protection laws to residen-
tial leases is unlikely to halt the continued use of unenforceable
lease provisions. Although Monumental Properties is consistent with
the underlying policies of consumer protection legislation, 37 the
Pennsylvania court's interpretation of "sale [of] ... any prop-
erty" 38 undoubtedly went beyond what the legislature had in-
tended. Although most states have statutes similar to the Pennsyl-
vania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, only
one other court has adopted the Monumental Properties ap-
proach.3 9  But even if such statutes could be stretched to cover
rental agreements, some of them do not authorize private rights
of action.40 In these states, tenants must rely on the government
33 The lower court dismissed the Commonwealth's complaint because, inter alia, the
leasing of residential housing did not fall within the scope of the consumer protection law.
Commonwealth v. Monumental Props., Inc., 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 596, 314 A.2d 333 (1973),
rev'd 459 Pa. 450, 329 A.2d 812 (1974).
34 "Trade or commerce" is defined as "the advertising, offering for sale, sale or dis-
tribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed,
and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situate, and includes any
trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this Commonwealth." PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-2(3) (Purdon Supp. 1978).
35 Id.
36 459 Pa. at 467-68, 329 A.2d at 820-2 1. The court also found substantial common-law
authority for the proposition that the leasing of property is the same as a sale of the
premises. Id. at 470-72, 329 A.2d at 822-23. The court drew additional support from the
broad interpretation given the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976).
459 Pa. at 473, 329 A.2d at 823.
31 See 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 411 (1975).
38 See notes 34-36 and accompanying text supra.
39 See Love v. Pressley, 34 N.C. App. 503, 239 S.E.2d 574 (1977), cert. denied, 294 N.C.
441, 241 S.E.2d 843 (1978).
40 As of late 1973, 13 of the 44 states which had enacted statutes based on the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976) did not allow private actions by consum-
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to enforce their rights. Other, and more pressing, concerns make
it unlikely that state attorneys general will devote much time and
effort to curbing abuses in this area. 41
One state has recently amended its consumer protection stat-
ute to eliminate these problems. The Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices-Consumer Protection Act 42 now includes leased real
property within its definition of "goods". 43  The Act prohibits
landlords from representing that a lease confers rights, remedies,
or obligations prohibited by law. 44 Tenants adversely affected by
such representations have a cause of action under the Act.45 The
statute provides for the award of treble damages, injunctive relief,
and reasonable attorney's fees in direct actions by tenants against
landlords. 4
6
Although the Texas statute goes a long way toward prevent-
ing deceptive practices by landlords, it does not furnish a means
for alerting tenants to their rights under the statute. If a tenant
relies on his lease to determine his rights, 47 he still has no notice
that certain provisions are unenforceable. The statute encourages
tenant initiative by providing powerful remedies, but remedies
alone cannot solve the basic problem of informing tenants who
are unaware of their rights and are without counsel.
B. Statutory Form Leases
Several commentators have suggested the enactment of a
statutory form lease to prevent landlords from including
unenforceable provisions in residential leases. 48  This approach
ers. See [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] 2 CONSUMERISM (CCH) 494. At the time of the
Monumental Properties decisions, Pennsylvania did not allow consumers to initiate private
actions; it now permits such suits. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-9.2 (Purdon Supp.
1978).
41 See 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 405, 407 (1975); 21 VILL. L. REv. 131, 139 (1975).
42 TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon Supp. 1978).
43 See id. § 17.45(1).
44 See id. §§ 17.45(1), .46. Section 17.46(b)(12) provides that "[tihe term 'false, mislead-
ing, or deceptive acts or practices' includes ... representing that an agreement confers or
involves rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not have or involve, or which are
prohibited by law." Moreover, § 17.42 expressly prohibits waivers of rights set out in the
Act.
Is See id. § 17 .50(a)(1). See Comment, Texas Landlord-Tenant Law and the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act-Affirmative Remedies for the Tenant, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 807, 815 (1977).
46 See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978).
47 See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
4' Groll, for example, has proposed legislation that would require all residential leases
to contain certain mandatory provisions. See Groll, supra note 11, at 92-93. He believes that
such an enactment best achieves the goal of promoting tenant awareness of their "rights
19791 529
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finds ample precedent in legislation regulating adhesion contracts
in the insurance and consumer credit fields. 49  A statutory form
lease is not a feasible solution, however, because it severely limits
the parties' ability to enter into a lease suited to their particular
needs. As Allen Bentley recognizes:
Unlike insurance contracts, which are in essence nothing more
than packages of legal rights predicated upon defined con-
tingencies, leases serve, or should serve, to set the framework
for an ongoing relationship between landlord and tenant. This
framework may vary with the location and nature of the rented
premises and the objectives of the parties.50
Because it is unlikely that a statutory form lease could accommo-
date all residential lessors and lessees, 51 legislatures should hesi-
tate to limit the parties' flexibility.5 2  Pressure from interest
and obligations." Id. at 89, 94. Bentley believes, with some reservations, that a statutory
form lease may be necessary to eliminate the abuses resulting from the continued use of
traditional form leases. Bentley, supra note 9, at 879-80. He fears that because of the hous-
ing shortage and the unreliability of lower courts in enforcing legislative intent, "statutory
invalidation of lease terms may prove unavailing to alter the pervasive pattern of tradi-
tional form leases." Id. at 879. Kirby believes that the problem with unfair form leases "is
not that the form is a form, but that it is promulgated by parties on one side of the
transaction and reflects their needs." Kirby, supra note 3, at 237. He maintains that enact-
ment of a statutory form lease "would equalize the tenant's positions vis- -vis the landlord"
as well as provide "a much needed measure of consistency and certainty in landlord-tenant
law." Id. at 235-36. See Garrity, supra note 3, at 717-18.
49 "Precedent for such an approach can be found in statutes that meticulously regulate
adhesion contracts in other areas, such as insurance, where bargaining over fine-print
forms has been ineffective and protection of the public has been found necessary."
Bentley, supra note 9, at 879-80. Garrity finds support for this approach in the retail in-
stallment sales acts. See Garrity, supra note 3, at 718.
50 Bentley, supra note 9, at 880.
51 See Mueller, supra note 15, at 277. But see Groll, supra note 11, at 93-94. Groll does
not believe that a statutory lease would necessarily lead to inflexibility; his proposal would
leave the parties free to bargain on matters not covered by the statutory lease. Id. at 93. He
also recommends the enactment of separate form leases for multi-unit and single-unit
premises. See id. at 94. Residential rental units, however, do not break down into two dis-
tinct categories. For instance, multi-unit buildings range from luxury apartments on Park
Avenue to low-income housing for the elderly to substandard housing in blighted urban
areas. Similarly, single-unit premises may be leased as a year-round residence, on a sea-
sonal basis, or to a number of unrelated individuals (e.g., students). If a statutory form lease
is so specific and detailed that it must be adapted to multi-unit and single-unit premises,
then additional lease categories will undoubtedly be necessary.
52 But see Kirby, supra note 3, at 236. Kirby maintains that statutory form leases cannot
destroy freedom of contract because there is not any now. He cites the fact that more than
98% of all residential leases in Chicago are form leases. Id.
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groups would compound drafting difficulties. 53 A statutory
form lease might be as "inequitable and unworkable" as any tradi-
tional form lease. 54
C. Mandatory Administrative Approval of Leases
Another possible solution to the problem of continued use of
unenforceable lease clauses is the creation of an administrative
agency with regulatory authority over residential leases. 55 A
major task of this agency would be to excise from leases all provi-
sions that the legislature or courts had declared unenforceable.
Landlords using leases that had not received administrative ap-
proval would be subject to strict penalties. 56
Although this approach avoids the inflexibility of a statutory
form lease, it presents problems of its own. Administrative review
is expensive. The state must fund and staff the administrative
agency and landlords will probably incur expenses seeking ap-
proval for proposed lease forms. 57  Nor does added expense en-
sure success. Wisconsin has established the Real Estate Examining
Board,5 8 which has incidental regulatory authority over leases.
Real estate brokers may use only board-approved lease forms. 59
" Landlords possess political power disproportionate to their number. See Bentley,
supra note 9, at 880. Bentley cites the enactment of vacancy decontrol in New York (ee
1971 N.Y. Laws ch. 371-372) as an example of legislative action that has favored landlords.
Bentley, supra note 9, at 880 n.250. Vacancy decontrol terminated rent controls of apart-
ments becoming vacant after the effective date of the decontrol legislation (see 1971 N.Y.
Laws, ch. 371, § 6), and restricted New York City's authority to extend rent controls and to
impose stricter controls on units already covered (see id., ch. 372, § 1).
54 Bentley, supra note 9, at 880.
5 See Garrity, supra note 3, at 717; Mueller, supra note 15, at 277.
56 Moran suggests that fines ranging from $100 to $500 would be adequate to enforce
such a regulatory scheme. See Moran, supra note 25, at 770 n.58.
57 A landlord who leases a wide variety of residential housing, e.g., houses, multi-unit
dwellings, furnished and unfurnished apartments, will need a number of different lease
forms. Furthermore, it is probable that landlords will employ counsel in order to receive
agency approval of the most favorable leases possible.
58 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 452.01-.20 (West 1974 & Supp. 1978).
59 WIs. AD. CODE § REB 7.01(2) (1972). Current regulations do not expressly extend to
residential leases (see id. § REB 7.01(3)), but they permit review of forms approved under
superseded regulations (see id.). Those regulations did extend to leases. See Wis. AD. CODE
§ REB 5.04 (1960) (repealed 1972). The Real Estate Examining Board has continued to
regulate residential leases. Telephone conversation with Walter Eglsaer, Attorney, Wiscon-
sin Real Estate Examining Board (Feb. 2, 1979).
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Nevertheless, a study of six approved lease forms has revealed
provisions that are invalid per se in Wisconsin.6" And, as the
commentator noted, board approval magnifies a landlord's bar-
gaining power because he "can point out that the lease is an ap-
proved form, implying that it represents what the state has de-
termined to be an equitable legal relationship. ' 6'
D. The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
The Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
(URLTA), currently in effect in thirteen states, 62 prohibits the use
in rental agreements of four types of lease provisions. 63  Knowing
violations expose landlords to tenant suits for actual damages and
penalties. 64  The URLTA further encourages tenants to act as
"private attorneys-general" 65 by permitting recovery of reasonable
attorney's fees. 66 An American Bar Association subcommittee has
criticized the penalty provisions as unnecessary because an
unenforceable lease provision theoretically cannot injure a ten-
60 See Note, Standard Form Leases in Wisconsin, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 583, 592.
61 Id.
62 The URLTA is currently in force, often in modified form, in: Alaska, Arizona,
Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oregon, Ten-
nessee, and Virginia. See 7A U.L.A. 17 (Supp. 1979).
63 Section 1.403(a) states:
A rental agreement may not provide that the tenant:
(1) agrees to waive or forego rights or remedies under this Act;
(2) authorizes any person to confess judgment on a claim arising out of the
rental agreement;
(3) agrees to pay the landlord's attorney's fees; or
(4) agrees to the exculpation or limitation of any liability of the landlord
arising under law or to indemnify the landlord for that liability or the
costs connected therewith.
64 Section 1.403(b) states:
A provision prohibited by subsection (a) included in a rental agreement is un-
enforceable. If a landlord deliberately uses a rental agreement containing pro-
visions known by him to be prohibited, the tenant may recover in addition to
his actual damages an amount up to [3] months' periodic rent and reasonable
attorney's fees.
65 Cf. MODEL CODE, supra note 21, at § 3-502 note (tenant to receive one-half of fine
assessed against landlord in order to foster private attorneys general).
66 See UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT § 1.403(b), quoted in note 64
supra-
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ant.67 The drafters, however, anticipated tenant reliance on in-
valid provisions, 68 and provided punitive damages to discourage
their continued use.6 9
Although the URLTA solution depends on tenant initiative,
the drafters did not ensure tenant awareness of its provisions.
Tenants are little more likely to know of the remedies supplied by
the URLTA than they are of the invalidity of certain lease provi-
sions.70  As a result, the URLTA will not deter landlords from
continuing to use such provisions. 7 1  The small risk of liability for
limited punitive damages and attorney's fees will probably not
offset the benefits that are gained by the inclusion of invalid
terms in leases.7 2
III
A PROPOSED SOLUTION
More effective legislation is needed to combat the continued
use of unenforceable lease provisions. The statute must be based
on deterrence-it should impose criminal penalties and award
judgments in excess of actual damages. At the same time, the
statute should punish only deliberate violations of the law 7 3-the
goal is to eradicate unenforceable lease clauses, not to enrich ten-
ants at the expense of landlords. Further, the statute must allow
67 See SUBCOMM. ON THE MODEL LANDLORD-TENANT ACT OF THE ABA COMM. ON LEASES,
REPORT ON THE PROPOSED UNIFoRM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT (1973), re-
printed in 8 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 104, 108 (1973).
68 The comment to § 1.403 notes that "[sluch provisions, even though unenforceable at
law may nevertheless prejudice and injure the rights and interests of the uninformed ten-
ant who may, for example, surrender or waive rights in settlement of an enforceable claim
against the landlord for damages arising from the landlord's negligence." See California
Hearings, supra note 11, at 9 (testimony of Julian Levi, Reporier/Draftsman, Uniform Resi-
dential Landlord and Tenant Act). For discussion of the effect of unenforceable provisions
on tenants' rights, see notes 21-29 and accompanying text supra.
9 See Note, supra note 19, at 96. Cf. MODEL CODE, supra note 21, at § 3-501 (criminal
sanctions).
70 See Berger, supra note 3, at 819.
71 The awarding of attorney's fees may encourage legal aid and consumer law clinics to
search for illegal lease clauses. It is unlikely, however, that this will happen to any signifi-
cant degree. Legal aid clinics generally do not have the manpower or resources to search
for illegal clauses on a large scale. Furthermore, many areas are not served by such clinics.
To the extent that clinic enforcement is effective, it will not be abrogated by the legislation
proposed in this Note. The proposed legislation is set out at text accompanying notes 79-82
infra.
72 For discussion of the benefits that landlords gain by continuing to use unenforceable
provisions, see notes 21-29 and accompanying text supra.
" Although the URLTA reaches only deliberate violations (see note 64 supra), some
reform proposals have advocated the imposition of absolute liability. The Model Residen-
tial Landlord-Tenant Code, for example, makes any use of confession of judgment clauses
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the parties to enter into a rental agreement suited to their particu-
lar needs 74 -compliance should not be unduly restrictive or ex-
pensive.
The statute should rely on tenant initiative for its enforce-
ment. Landlords have not voluntarily removed unenforceable
lease provisions,7 5 and state enforcement is generally ineffec-
tive. 76  As the drafters of the Model Residential Landlord-Tenant
Code pointed out, "[t]he single party most interested in enforcing
a landlord's social obligations is the tenant most directly af-
fected." 7 Before tenants can take the initiative, however, they
must have simple and effective notice of their statutory rights.
78
The following proposed legislation incorporates provisions of
the URLTA, but could easily be modified for use in any state that
has proscribed certain lease provisions.
PART I - REGULATION OF AGREEMENTS
AND PRACTICES
Section 1.101 Prohibited Lease Provisions
79
(a) A residental rental agreement may not provide that the
tenant:
(1) agrees to waive or forego rights or remedies under
the laws of this State;
in leases a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $200. See MODEL CODE, supra note
21, at §§ 3-404, 3-501. Similarly, Moran would penalize any landlord who includes a prohib-
ited provision in a rental agreement. See Moran, supra note 25, at 770. A scienter re-
quirement is important, however, to protect the "mom and pop" landlords, who are not
likely to know about recent changes in the law. See note 13 supra.
71 See notes 50-52 and accompanying text supra. As Mueller notes, a "conflict exists
between the desire to have leases appropriate to individual situations and the desire to
avoid emasculating ameliorative measures to the extent that the tenant's plight would be
scarcely relieved." Mueller, supra note 15, at 277. A workable solution must address this
problem.
75 See notes 9-12 and accompanying text supra.
71 See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
" MODEL CODE, supra note 21, at § 3-502 note.
78 Groll maintains that one of the problems with reform legislation such as the Model
Residential Landlord-Tenant Code is that it does not provide "the element of communica-
tion," i.e., notice- to tenants of their rights. See Groll, supra note 11, at 89 & n.26. The
URLTA suffers from this defect as well. See notes 70-72 and accompanying text supra. See
generally Berger, supra note 3, at 820-21. In addition, for such notice to be effective, it must
be in language that the average tenant can understand. See generally N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW
§ 5-701(b) (McKinney 1978) ("[Elvery written agreement ... for the lease of space to be
occupied for residential purposes ... must be: (1) Written in non-technical language and in
a clear and coherent manner using words with common and every day meanings .... "
1a This section is substantially the same as § 1.403(a) of the URLTA. Section 1.403(a) is
set out in note 63 supra.
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(2) authorizes any person to confess judgment on a claim
arising out of the rental agreement;
(3) agrees to pay the landlord's attorney's fees; or
(4) agrees to the exculpation or limitation of any liability
of the landlord arising under the laws of this State or to
indemnify the landlord for that liability or the costs con-
nected therewith.
(b) A provision prohibited by subsection (a) included in a res-
idential rental agreement is unenforceable.
Section 1.102 Disclosure to the Tenant
(a) A residential rental agreement must contain the following
notice to the tenant:
NOTICE TO TENANT
1. Your lease cannot require you t6 give up any
rights that you have under the laws of this State.
2. Your lease cannot require you to plead guilty to a
court action brought by your landlord. You have the
right to be heard in any action brought against you.
3. Your lease cannot require you to pay your land-
lord's attorney's fees.
4. Your lease cannot forbid you to sue your land-
lord. Your lease cannot excuse your landlord from
any liabilities arising under the laws of this State.
(b) The notice required by subsection (a):
(1) must be conspicuously placed within the lease;
(2) must be printed on a yellow background which con-
trasts with the color of the lease paper; and
(3) must be printed in black letters which are not less
than the equivalent of 10 point type or .075 inch com-
puter type.81 1
OFFICIAL COMMENT
Section 1.102 contemplates the use of a yellow sticker to
inform the tenant, in nontechnical language, of lease provisions
prohibited by law. Landlords could purchase these stickers at
legal stationery stores and affix them to leases. As the law
changes, the stickers can be updated accordingly.
80 The type-size requirements are similar to those required under the regulations inci-
dent to the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1976). See 12 C.F.R. § 226.6
(1978).
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PART II REMEDIES AND PENALTIES
Section 2.101 Civil Liability
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a landlord
who uses a rental agreement containing prohibited provi-
sions or who fails to comply with the disclosure require-
ments of section 1.102 is liable to the tenant in an amount
equal to the sum of:
(1) the tenant's actual damages;
(2) three months' periodic rent; and
(3) the tenant's reasonable attorney's fees.
(b) A landlord shall not be liable for a violation under this
section if the landlord shows by a preponderance of the
evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted
from bona fide error s. 8
Section 2.102 Criminal Liability 82
A landlord is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction
may be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding $500 if he wil-
fully and knowingly fails to comply with the disclosure re-
quirements of section 1.102.
Ample precedent for this proposed statute comes from recent
consumer credit legislation.8 3 There is evidence that the disclo-
sure requirements of such legislation have been effective in in-
creasing consumer knowledge about the true cost of credit.8 4
81 This sentence derives from the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c) (1976)
and Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 5.203(3).
82 This section derives from Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 5.302.
83 Regulation Z incident to the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1976),
for example, requires that, whenever a transaction is rescindable, "the creditor shall give
notice of that fact to the customer." 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(b) (1978). The creditor must furnish
"two copies of the notice ... one of which may be used by the consumer to cancel the
transaction." Id. Similarly, regulations incident to the Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1666-1666j (1976), require creditors to make a semiannual disclosure of creditor respon-
sibilites and customer rights to each account with an outstanding balance or with a financial
charge imposed. See 12 C.F.R. § 226.7(d) (1978).
84 See Garwood, A Look at Truth in Lending-Five Years After, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 491
(1974). Garwood cites as evidence of the effectiveness of the Truth-in-Lending-Act disclo-
sure requirements: (1) the "increase in competitive 'annual percentage rate' advertising
among banks" (id. at 501-02), (2) the fact that the standard 18% charge for revolving credit
accounts "now seems to be a well known middle-class household fact" (id. at 502), and (3) a
survey by the Federal Reserve Board indicating an increase in consumer awareness of the
cost of credit (id. at 501). Garwood also maintains that increased "challenge[s) to the valid-
ity of confession of judgment clauses" have probably been a side effect of Truth-in-
Lending's disclosure and rescission provisions. Id. at 503. See generally Garwood, Truth-in-
Lending After Two Years, 89 BANKING L.J. 3 (1972). But see Note, The Impact of Truth in
Lending on Automobile Financing-An Empirical Study, 4 U. CAL D. L. REv. 179, 204 (1971)
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Disclosure legislation in landlord-tenant law should be equally ef-
fective in increasing the parties' awareness of their statutory rights
in a lease transaction. 85 Unlike consumer credit legislation, how-
ever, the proposed statute is neither complex nor difficult to
comply with.
CONCLUSION
The acute imbalance of power in landlord-tenant relations
has spurred courts and legislatures to invalidate certain residential
lease provisions. Landlords have undercut these efforts by con-
tinuing to include unenforceable clauses in leases. Attempts to
solve this problem have been wide of the mark. Statutory form
leases go too far-they confine the parties within too restrictive a
framework. Statutory provisions that permit tenants to recover
punitive damages do not go far enough-they fail to alert tenants
to their rights. A workable solution must combine notice with de-
terrence. The statute proposed in this Note ensures that tenants
will be aware of unenforceable lease provisions and penalizes the
deliberate use of such provisions. At the same time, it preserves
the parties' flexibility to tailor a rental agreement to their objec-
tives and the nature of the premises. In addition, compliance with
the statute will be easy and inexpensive. The proposed enactment
shares the objectives of consumer credit legislation, and the con-
sumer of credit is no more in need of such protection than is the
consumer of rental housing.
Kurt E. Olafsen
(although "beneficial to many, [Truth in Lending] has not yet reached the vast majority of
the credit using public").
85 Landlords as well as tenants may be ignorant of recent changes in landlord-tenant
law. See note 13 supra. Many landlords might remove unenforceable provisions from leases
if made aware of their invalidity.
One state has passed legislation establishing disclosure requirements in the landlord-
tenant context. The New Jersey Truth-in-Renting Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:8-43 to -49
(West Supp. 1978) requires the Department of Community Affairs to prepare a statement
of the rights and obligations of landlords and tenants. Id. § 46:8-45. Landlords must distrib-
ute this statement to their tenants as well as post copies in a location "prominent and
accessible" to the tenants. Id. § 46:8-46. This legislation does not deal directly with the
problem discussed in this Note, and it leaves wide discretion to an administrative agency as
to the coverage of the statement. Nevertheless, it does provide precedent for the imposi-
tion of disclosure requirements in landlord-tenant relations.
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